Stanford student JB (Jong Beom) Lim and recent alumni Darren Hall, Yoojung Lee, E Ju Ro, and Maleah Webster all had the opportunity to work as research assistants with the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL). They also have another thing in common: all are heading next fall to prestigious programs where they will embark on their doctoral training in law, political studies, and sociology.

Housed at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and led by sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, SNAPL addresses emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges facing Asia-Pacific countries and guides effective U.S. Asia policies through interdisciplinary, comparative, and data-driven research. A core mission of the lab, which Shin founded in summer 2023, is to support and mentor the next generation of Asia scholars through its fellowship opportunities and research assistantships.

“The success of our former research assistants demonstrates exactly the kind of impact I envisioned when I launched SNAPL,” says Shin, who also serves as the director of APARC and the center’s Korea Program and Taiwan Program. “Our lab is a space where young researchers engage deeply with urgent issues in Asian affairs and U.S.-Asia relations while building the skills and networks to carry them forward as they pursue advanced academic training. I am tremendously proud of what our bright young scholars have achieved – they will be leaders in Asian studies.”

​​In its short history, SNAPL has already seen previous team members advance to graduate studies at top institutions. These include current PhD students Kelsi Caywood (sociology, University of Michigan); Sean Chen (economics, Princeton University); Haley Gordon (sociology, Stanford University); and Vineet Gupta (sociology, Northwestern University).

We spoke with Darren, Yoojung, JB, E Ju, and Maleah about their experience at SNAPL, next steps in their academic journeys, and advice for new students. The responses below were slightly edited for clarity and style. 

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Darren Hall 

Darren Hall graduated from Stanford in 2023 with a bachelor’s degree in East Asian studies. Darren received multiple department awards for his undergraduate work, including the Kung-Yi Kao Prize for Outstanding Progress in the Study of the Korean Language and the James J.Y. Liu Prize for Outstanding Writing in an East Asian Languages and Cultures Course.

After graduation, he was a research assistant for the “Nationalism and Racism in Asia” track at SNAPL. In that role, he conducted a literature review, consulted with the project team to improve research methods, and helped conceptualize and develop the foundation for the project’s eventual publication.

“SNAPL not only provided me with mentorship but also an opportunity to investigate the interplay of nationalism and racism throughout Asia,” he says.

After his time at SNAPL, Darren worked as a corporate legal assistant at BraunHagey & Borden LLP, where he supported a team of attorneys through multi-million dollar transactions.

In fall 2025, Darren will begin his first year at Yale Law School. He plans to explore international conflict resolution and continue to develop his advocacy for underrepresented communities. Darren intends to become an attorney who prioritizes compassion and justice.

Yoojung Lee

Yoojung Lee graduated from Stanford in 2023 with a master’s degree in East Asian studies. In the coming fall quarter, she will embark on her new path as a doctoral student in sociology at Harvard University. Her research centers on a comparative investigation of political polarization through the intersecting lenses of gender, race, and ethnicity. 

Her time at SNAPL, while working for the “Nationalism and Racism in Asia” research track, and the generosity and depth of insight of the lab’s community of scholars have left a lasting imprint on Yoojung and broadened her intellectual framework. “The diversity of experiences and perspectives within the lab has profoundly reshaped how I engage with the world, not only in terms of how I think, but also in what I prioritize, whose voices I amplify, and how I approach the questions that guide my research.”

Yoojung also credits the SNAPL community for advancing her personal development. “The collaborative spirit of the lab and the dedicated mentorship I’ve received have influenced how I navigate challenges, engage with complexity, and embrace uncertainty. Within this space, I’ve learned to view setbacks as opportunities for growth and stay grounded in the deeper purpose behind my work. It is also here that the idea of pursuing a PhD, once abstract and distant, transformed into a tangible, deeply personal goal.”

The clarity, conviction, and sense of direction Yoojung feels about her academic path are inseparable from the lessons, experiences, and support she has found at SNAPL. “For all of this, I am eternally grateful: not only for the intellectual enrichment, but for the sense of belonging, purpose, and hope that SNAPL has given me. These are the gifts I will carry with me into my PhD and beyond.”

JB Lim

JB (Jong Beom) Lim will graduate this spring from Stanford with a master's degree in computer science and bachelor's degrees in mathematical and computational science and international relations. He has received interdisciplinary honors from the Center for International Security and Cooperation, with his undergraduate thesis recognized by the Center for East Asian Studies and the Hoover Institution.

In fall 2025, JB will begin his doctorate as a Raymond Vernon Fellow at Harvard University's Department of Government. He will examine how economic interdependence shapes national security strategies, focusing on how domestic interest groups influence foreign policy decisions regarding technology and trade. As part of his research, JB also hopes to develop quantitative methods in machine learning and causal inference, leveraging large-scale granular data.

At SNAPL, JB assisted with the “U.S.-Asia Relations” research track. “Working at SNAPL introduced me to cutting-edge political science research and allowed me to build novel datasets on congressional speeches and scholarly networks,” he says. “This experience sharpened my methodological skills and taught me to approach complex questions creatively and with rigor.”

JB’s advice to current students? “Embrace interdisciplinary research – it opens unexpected doors and broadens your understanding of global challenges.”

E Ju Ro

At Stanford, E Ju Ro earned her master's and bachelor's degrees in sociology, a minor in philosophy, and honors in Ethics in Society. Beginning in the coming fall quarter, she will attend New York University Law School. She is particularly interested in international human rights and critical legal studies. 

As a research assistant with SNAPL, E Ju had the opportunity to work on the “Nationalism and Racism in Asia” track, specifically on a study analyzing the discourse of state party reports submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) by 16 Northeast, Southeast, and South Asian countries.

“It was fascinating to examine the reports various Asian governments sent CERD, as I could see how their specific cultural and historical contexts shaped the ways they dealt with (or did not deal with) racial issues,” says E Ju. “While pursuing sociology studies at Stanford, I’d felt that most of my research experience and classes had focused on the United States, so this was a refreshing chance to look at the construction of race across time and borders."

Maleah Webster

At Stanford, Maleah Webster received a bachelor's degree in international relations with honors and distinction. She concentrated on East and South Asia and social development and human well-being.

This coming fall, Maleah will begin a doctorate in sociology at Stanford. Her research investigates how migrant communities navigate identity, belonging, and access to resources in contexts where ethnic homogeneity is closely tied to national identity. She focuses on institutions as key sites where integration is negotiated and contested, whether through policy, discourse, or lived experience. Currently, she conducts fieldwork in South Korea, using interviews, surveys, and policy analysis to decipher how multiculturalism is defined and experienced in real-world settings.

Maleah describes her experience working as a research assistant with SNAPL as a highly valuable part of her time at Stanford. She, too, worked on the lab’s “Nationalism and Racism in Asia” research track. “It gave me a real sense of how cross-national research can inform policy in nuanced and meaningful ways. Being part of SNAPL helped me see how institutions don’t just implement policy – they help define who counts, who belongs, and who gets overlooked.”

Her tip for new students is to “take the initiative to get involved with research early, especially in interdisciplinary spaces like SNAPL. You never know what opportunities (or career trajectories) it might open up.”

A Pivotal Moment for Climate Policy

In early May, Israel faced its second major wildfire in a month, as flames tore through the woodlands around Jerusalem, forcing the shutdown of the central region and the cancellation of Independence Day celebrations. Conference Chair, Professor Alon Tal, Visiting Fellow in Israel Studies and a leading environmental advocate, explained that once a rare occurrence, such fires have become far more frequent, reflecting a broader international pattern.

“In the past, fires of this magnitude maybe happened once a decade,” Tal noted. “But like California, Israel’s fire service now reports a tripling of high-risk fire days — ultra-dry conditions paired with high winds. This is an international phenomenon. This past year, Canadian fires destroyed 45 million acres of woodlands — seven times the annual average. Israel has received a wake-up call about the impacts of the climate crisis.”

Across two days of programming, the conference will bring together 25 Israeli experts to discuss potential solutions alongside colleagues from Los Angeles and California. “This is not just a policy conversation. This is about how we prepare our communities for an uncertain future,” Tal said. “Both Los Angeles and Tel Aviv are confronting real environmental risks, but they also have the innovation ecosystems and civic infrastructure needed to respond creatively. We have a lot to learn from studying them side by side.”

Comparing Los Angeles and Tel Aviv offers scholars and policymakers unique insights, Tal believes. “These are two of the most creative cities in the world. They both have thriving tech sectors and liberal city governments with resources and professional expertise. At the same time, they face comparable challenges: they are both dryland cities on rising coastlines, where heat waves are becoming more treacherous. Bringing their top experts together at Stanford has tremendous merit.”

Rethinking Climate Governance at the City Level

Tal emphasized that local governments are increasingly bearing the burden of climate adaptation, especially in societies marked by inequality and demographic complexity. “The changing climate brings new challenges that cities need to be ready for. And they aren’t,” he said. “Most people live in cities — they need the tools (and the budget) to reduce new risks. The LA fires have left enormous human suffering in their wake, just like the climate-driven floods in New Orleans, Houston, and New York City did. So, the question is: what steps should cities take proactively to avert disasters and maintain stability?”

While Tal emphasized the immediate environmental threats, Larry Diamond, Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and director of the Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program, framed the discussion within a broader governance context. “It is often said that ‘all politics is local,’ and there is a policy corollary to that. While we need national policies and international coordination to reduce fossil fuel emissions and accelerate the transition to renewable energy, the challenges of climate adaptation and resilience are also deeply local and must be met at that level. This is a great opportunity for all of us to learn from two cities on the front lines of the challenge in our respective countries — Tel Aviv and Los Angeles.”
 

A Vision for Collaborative Learning

The event also reflects the broader goals of Stanford’s Visiting Fellows in Israel Studies program, launched in 2023 to foster cross-disciplinary analysis of Israel and its unique position as a regional influence and geopolitical actor. The program appoints an Israel-based scholar to serve as a visiting fellow at FSI for a recurring three-year term. The fellow will teach courses related to some aspect of Israel’s politics, society, economy, modern history, technological development, and/or regional or international relations, as well as advise students and collaborate with faculty interested in Israel and the Middle East.

Diamond emphasized the significance of the conference in fulfilling the program’s mission. “One of our key goals in the Israel Studies Program is to engage scholars, policymakers, and civil society leaders in Israel, not only individually but collectively based on their expertise. And we seek to promote functional and scholarly interaction and mutual learning. This conference is a historic opportunity to advance this mission in the realm of climate resilience.”

Tal also highlighted the significance of hosting the conference at Stanford. “Stanford has become the world’s leading academic center for researching critical ecological problems like biodiversity and climate change. The Doerr School of Sustainability and the involvement of Nobel laureate Steven Chu as a keynote speaker make this an unparalleled opportunity for collaboration.”

Building a Lasting Impact

Tal hopes the conference will catalyze new approaches to addressing climate impacts. “It’s clear that new environmental conditions require new strategies and technologies. Seeing practical solutions firsthand is crucial, but they don’t matter without policies that enable cities to step up their climate mitigation game. Success stories need to be shared.”

The conference outcomes will be documented in a special issue of the academic journal Sustainability, ensuring that insights resonate beyond the event itself. “By focusing on urban policies and highlighting both successes and failures, we aim to chart pathways for cities to live with global warming while mitigating emissions to address the root causes,” Tal said.

Diamond further expressed his hopes for the conference’s impact. “We hope participants will not only take away specific ideas and strategies from the two cities and countries but also connections that can be of mutual practical value going forward. We want to underscore that Israel and California, with their similar climates and start-up cultures, have a particularly rich set of possibilities for collaboration and mutual learning.”

Community members and members of the public are invited to participate in this pivotal conversation. To view the full agenda and register, visit the conference website.

Mounting hidden local government debt is one of China’s pressing challenges. Held by local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and estimated between US$8-10 trillion, this off-the-books debt originates from a long-running tug-of-war over tax revenue between China’s central government and the localities. In the years before COVID-19, LGFVs controlled their debt by drawing on steady non-tax revenues. In summer 2020, however, approximately six months after the pandemic broke out in Wuhan, the hidden debt held by LGFVs began rising dramatically. Today, many of them are nearing default, and local governments are increasingly going broke.

​​Why did hidden LGFV debt rise so much during COVID?

A recent study, published in The China Journal, sheds light on this question. The study’s co-authors – including Jean Oi, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and director of the China Program at APARC – use quantitative data to show how China’s central government’s regulatory crackdowns on income tied to the real estate sector during the pandemic disrupted the revenue sources LGFVs and their local governments relied on to service their debts. These policy changes “interacted with the zero-COVID policy to create a perfect storm, pushing hidden local government debt to new highs,” they write. 

Their study draws on a wide array of quantitative data, tracking information on factors ranging from COVID shocks (including confirmed cases and deaths) to, among others, government medical responses, special treasury bonds and their allocation, local debt, land purchases, and business activities. Using these sources, the co-authors built a province-level dataset covering all 31 of China’s provincial units from 2018 to 2022, allowing comparative analyses before and after China’s COVID shocks. They organized the data into three categories: (1) the impact of COVID on small and medium enterprises; (2) government fiscal responses and COVID expenditures during the pandemic; and (3) local government finances and debts.

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The Pre-COVID Era: The Grand Bargain That Failed

China’s local debt problem traces back to the 1994 fiscal reforms, which recentralized tax revenues in Beijing and left local governments with chronic budget shortfalls. To bridge the gap, the central government struck a “grand bargain”: while claiming a larger share of tax income, localities could generate new non-tax revenues through special-purpose vehicles, namely, local government financing vehicles. These LGFVs were set up as state-owned enterprises to incur and hold debt off-the-books, yet not illegally, on behalf of local governments.

The workaround fueled rapid development for years but laid the groundwork for today’s mounting hidden debt crisis.

“The success of LGFVs hinged largely on revenue generated through land finance,” explain Oi and her co-authors. “Local governments provided LGFVs with cheap land as collateral for bank loans and bonds. Further revenue was generated from preparing and selling land to real estate developers.”

Thus, LGFVs powered over a decade of rapid growth in China, driving infrastructure booms and urbanization that made the real estate sector a cornerstone of the economy. The model appeared mutually beneficial: the central government gained more tax revenue as the economy grew, while local governments used land sales and debt to fund development. But this growth depended on a continuous flow of non-tax income, making the system increasingly fragile.

After the 2008 global financial crisis, Beijing launched a sustained push to rein in local government hidden debt, focusing heavily on LGFVs. By 2017, officials labeled the risk a “gray rhino.” Yet this drive for fiscal discipline ground to a halt with the onset of COVID.

A Perfect Storm of Policy and Pandemic

The pandemic’s impact was swift and severe. Small and medium-sized businesses, especially in the hardest-hit regions like Hubei Province, saw their incomes collapse by up to 90%. In response, Beijing provided a massive fiscal support package to localities, including one trillion yuan in special COVID bonds to offset the costs from the initial onslaught of the pandemic. Crucial for LGFVs, these bonds cushioned the impact of the pandemic on land sales.

By summer 2020, however, as China was still locked away from the rest of the world and COVID was under control, Beijing resumed its policy agenda to enforce fiscal discipline and curb local government debt. The central government’s most consequential measure was the “three red lines” policy, which dealt a major blow to China’s real estate sector by sharply restricting developers’ ability to borrow once debt thresholds were crossed. The policy, expanded from 12 pilot firms in 2020 to cover the entire sector by 2021, disrupted the “borrow-to-grow” model and triggered a liquidity crisis. Evergrande, China’s second-biggest property developer, was among the first groups affected.

As borrowing dried up, firms struggled to repay debt, halted construction, and stopped buying land, slashing local government revenues. Land sales plummeted across provinces, with national revenue growth from land transfers plunging into negative territory by 2022. The crisis deepened when unfinished housing projects led to mortgage boycotts by frustrated home buyers, prompting more state intervention.

For local governments, the shift came at a steep cost. They were ordered to step in, using LGFVs to purchase land and inject cash into public budgets. As a result, even wealthier provinces like Shanghai and Guangdong saw sharp increases in LGFV debt.

“The call for LGFVs to buy land to create revenue for local governments made matters worse, turning land from a key source of revenue into a source of new debt and forcing LGFVs further to increase borrowing, all of which caused soaring increases in LGFV debt, without any alternative revenue source to service or pay that debt,” explain Oi and her co-authors.

A Fiscal Reform Imperative

The study shows how China’s shifts in central government policies during the pandemic – especially the three red lines and the directive for LGFVs to buy up unwanted land — exacerbated long-standing vulnerabilities in local public finance. What had been a delicate balancing act quickly became unsustainable.

“At the root of China’s continuing crisis of LGFVs' debt is China’s flawed fiscal system,” the co-authors emphasize. Before the pandemic, the system masked deficits by relying on LGFVs to generate off-the-books revenues, primarily through land sales fueled by a booming real estate market. This arrangement allowed Beijing to capture the bulk of tax revenue while localities chased growth. But when COVID struck and the property sector collapsed, the facade crumbled.

The fallout exposed how deeply local governments had come to depend on land finance – an unstable, non-institutionalized revenue stream. With the real estate sector once accounting for over 20 percent of GDP, its collapse left localities and their financing vehicles adrift. “In the context of a crisis such as COVID, the weakness of the fiscal system and LGFVs was exposed as policy instability added to the volatility of the economic situation,” Oi and her co-authors note.

The local government debt problem might not trigger a financial crisis in China, “but LGFVs and their local governments remain in dire straits,” they write. More worrying, the economy has not rebounded in the post-COVID years as hoped, and “as long as the real estate sector remains depressed, land finance will not be able to make local government budgets whole as it once did. The grand bargain can’t work.”

Rather than assume the debt, Beijing is extending lifelines: urging banks to offer LGFVs 25-year loans with temporary interest relief, approving debt swaps into longer maturity municipal bonds, and allowing new issuances of special-purpose bonds. But these are stopgaps, not solutions.

Hidden debt will keep resurfacing unless China overhauls the fiscal system born out of the 1994 reforms, Oi and her co-authors conclude. Institutionalized, dependable, alternative revenue streams for local governments are needed, or the crisis will persist. “It may be time for Chinese leadership to stop kicking the can down the road and undertake institutional reforms of the fiscal system. This may be painful, but there is no other sustainable solution.”

gaps persist between stakeholders. This is exacerbated by the lack of clear, standardized specifications from NATO, leading to inconsistent implementation and operational friction. Second, at its core, this is an intelligence-sharing challenge: member states operate under different national frameworks, threat perceptions, and priorities, which influence what information they are willing (or unwilling) to share. Third, the fragmentation of sharing systems is not merely a technical hurdle but often a deliberate choice made for operational and security reasons, reflecting concerns over sovereignty, data protection, and strategic advantage.

While technological advancements can enhance interoperability, they alone will not drive adoption. Our research highlights that the underlying issue is one of trust and incentives—NATO must establish mechanisms that encourage collaboration beyond just technological solutions. Without a strong foundation of mutual trust, transparency, and shared benefits, even the most advanced systems will face resistance. Creating sustainable incentives for participation—whether through policy alignment, risk reduction assurances, or value-added intelligence sharing—will be essential in fostering a more effective and unified cyber defense posture within NATO.

A key component of our project involves conducting in-depth research and stakeholder interviews focused on Mongolia's "Billion Trees Initiative," where we will be seeking actionable insights to scale up the initiative effectively and sustainably.

influencers work with politicians to coordinate these influence operations and shape public opinion. Our policy recommendations will address how governments and civil societies can work together to tackle this issue.

Australian Space Agency and U.S. Defense Innovation Unit, the goal of this project is to leverage Australia's strategic geographic position and investment in reentry infrastructure to mitigate the hurdles that U.S. commercial startups experience accessing military ranges for reentry. Our project aims to create a robust foundation for the development of orbital return capabilities in Australia, fostering greater commercial and national security collaboration between the U.S. and Australia.

to computational resources acts as a barrier to adoption. India has a thriving tech sector, and openly available AI models have the potential to democratize access to this trailblazing technology. At the same time, AI is expensive to build and deploy, and access to the specialized computational resources needed to do so is limited even for top Indian companies. Our team aims to develop solutions in partnership with Digital Futures Lab that can help bolster the AI ecosystem across India.

that contribute to this issue. During our fieldwork, we will explore community- and government-driven programs aimed at preventing and combating trafficking. Our final report will analyze existing policies, pinpoint gaps, and propose community-led interventions to address them.

The "Meet Our Researchers" series showcases the incredible scholars at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Through engaging interviews conducted by our undergraduate research assistants, we explore the journeys, passions, and insights of CDDRL’s faculty and researchers.

How has infrastructure development been used to gain influence in diplomacy? How has our understanding of that tool changed since BRI, and how successful has it been for China?

Infrastructure development has always been a problematic tool for amassing geopolitical influence; it builds friendships when loans are going out, then creates enemies once they’re issued. A recent example is the 1997 Asian financial crisis when Western countries had invested in power plants throughout the continent, only for many countries to default and expropriate. This has happened repeatedly throughout history.

While China’s done quite well at protecting its economic interests in infrastructure projects, it's a mixed bag due to the prevalence of moral hazard, public backlash, and the tarnishing of diplomatic ties. With the state being so heavily involved in BRI, China intervenes when countries want to default or expropriate, protecting its interests and those of state-owned enterprises effectively. However, this can lead to a moral hazard problem because these enterprises feel too protected by China and act without the appropriate caution while building risky projects.

Today, many countries that have received BRI lending have serious relational problems with China, if not at the government level, then among the public. People tend to push back and feel taken advantage of when a foreign country comes in and builds projects, especially with rumor mills churning out narratives about China’s 'debt-trap diplomacy.' These diplomatic challenges were true long before the BRI and persist today.

Why do countries, through BRI or other means, decide to take on infrastructure projects they obviously can’t afford?

Countries often don’t behave rationally — politics, corrupt officials, and conflicting interests all affect policymaking. Also, everyone builds infrastructure projects that may bankrupt them, partly due to an ingrained optimism bias in the infrastructure sector.

We’re in the worst developing country debt crisis in modern history, and countries are having a difficult time navigating a changing infrastructure lending landscape. China is now the largest bilateral lender, and its absence from international organizations like the Paris Club prevents the unified action needed to allow countries to emerge from debt crises. Even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is struggling to help them, as it is cautious about issuing aid to countries with murky BRI loans to pay back.

Funding for infrastructure development can be used as an incentive for democratization through conditionality on loans. However, many countries are turning away from traditional Western lending institutions in favor of alternative lenders with fewer conditions. How can we balance the importance of conditionality and incentivizing democratization while preventing the decreased reliance on Western institutions?

Conditionality can be positive in promoting democratization, but there have to be limits to it, especially because it becomes less effective when alternative lenders like China exist. Conditionality began as limited to policies that promote democratization, development, and liberalization but has metastasized to the point where lenders are pushing a wide range of policies on borrower countries. Many of these conditions, such as environmental or social protections, are good policies but can be viewed as a manifestation of Western imperialism within these countries. These programs also become futile when countries become simply incentivized to seek Chinese loans instead, which have virtually no conditionality.

Is the turn away from Western lending institutions an inevitable shift, or can policy changes encourage its prodominance again, if that’s something that we want?

Western institutions are better for infrastructure development, as organizations like the World Bank are the best at protecting human rights and preventing environmental disasters. There are also strategic and security reasons for promoting Western institutions — for example, we don’t want Chinese technology companies building telecommunications grids in other countries.

The bigger question is, what would a return to a Western-dominated model of investment look like? Pre-BRI, there was an open, liberal system of direct investment from private companies. BRI represented a pivot to more state-driven investment. Should the US shift to a similar model, or return to private direct investment fueling infrastructure development? The Biden administration’s alternative to BRI for state-driven investment was the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). Despite mutual investment in telecommunications and renewable energy, PGII focuses on developing very different sectors than BRI, building social impact projects like healthcare infrastructure.

What is the most exciting or impactful finding from your research, and why do you think it matters for democracy, development, or the rule of law?

I’m focusing on how liberal democracies can get building again, so I researched flaws in domestic infrastructure projects within the US. It revealed how the judicial system was an engine fueling how infrastructure projects are conducted; I realized the extent to which permitting regulation and environmental litigation had been driving my own incentives when I was a bureaucrat. Decisions are often made in response to case law and to ‘litigation-proof’ projects, which can incentivize inefficient and expensive project management. I believe democracies are perfectly capable of building infrastructure projects well, but problems in current building initiatives, from the California High-Speed Rail to our housing crisis, are rooted in the outsized effects of the threat of lawsuits.
 

How do you see your research influencing policy or contributing to real-world change?

I do research on practical public-private partnership policy in the United States, working with the Build America Center and the Department of Transportation to directly supply the government with research when needed.

There are policy changes that must occur to promote effective infrastructure development. The US will have to reform institutions that predated BRI to adapt to today’s post-BRI world. The three key institutions are the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). I hope that my ideas can influence their restructuring. For domestic development, I’m continuing my work with the Build America Center on how governments can more efficiently procure infrastructure projects and help public officials adopt best practices.

Lastly, what book would you recommend for students interested in a research career in your field?

The first book, which is extraordinarily boring but crucial to infrastructure development, is The Strategic Management of Large Engineering Projects: Shaping Institutions, Risks, and Governance. Written by Miller, Lessard, Michaud, and Floricel, it includes the perspectives of MIT engineers on infrastructure project case studies to understand why so many have failed. For some great history, the economist Raymond Vernon’s book Sovereignty at Bay develops the idea that relationships sour over international investment and that it’s not an effective diplomatic tool.

The second installment discusses the administration’s efforts to cut off funding to democracy-promoting organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and USAID, despite congressional approval, which violates the law and undermines democracy. Fukuyama and Diamond highlight how, historically, authoritarian regimes erode the rule of law while claiming democratic legitimacy. They warn that the U.S. is heading toward a constitutional crisis, as Trump's disregard for judicial authority could set a dangerous precedent. Finally, they urge vigilance and legal challenges to uphold liberal democratic principles and institutional checks and balances.

In January, Fukuyama and Diamond also shared their annual review of democracy around the world. Part I focuses on global democracy after the “year of elections,” while Part II examines the state of democracy in the U.S. Both videos can be viewed below.